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OF all the writers of the transition period between medieval
and modern philosophy, probably no one represents its general
characteristics better than Giordano Pruno. for in his numerous
works, poetical, scientific, philosophical, are reflected all the dis-
tinctive features of that period, the revolt against authoritx", the
demolition of the artificial division that existed between things
sacred and secular, human and divine, the exultation of intellectual
freedom and the consequent intellectual unsettlement and unrest,
the revival of ancient philosophy, as well as the predilection for the
occult sciences and arts and the despairing tendency to blend the
dreams and vagaries of the imagination with the results of rational
investigation.
Although there is no systematic unit}' to his multifarious writ-
ings, expressive of an intellectual enthusiasm and of a mind seeking
after truth }et undisciplined and erratic, full of speculations,
theories, conjectures, propounded on the impulse of the moment or
under the varying influence of the circumstances of the atmosphere
in which he moved, his mind seems to have been dominated by one
central idea, that of the divinity of nature and man, an idea which
he constantly sought to explain and defend by means partly of
Aristotelian categories and parti}' of Neo-Platonic emanation
theories, for above all else he was profoundly sympathetic with the
revolt against the medieval notion of a transcendant God. and a
sphere of divine things absolutely separated from nature and the
secular life of mankind. During the scholastic period, the course
of religious thought had not only tended to greater obscure the
Christian idea of the unity of the divine and human but the
ecclesiastical conception of God as well had gradually become that
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of a Being above the world, to whom thought can be related only
as the passive recipient of mysterious dogmas authoritatively re-
vealed, and not of a Being who reveals Himself in and to the human
spirit. Such a false exaltation of the idea of God could lead to
nothing but the degradation of nature, and the individual and social
life of man. Obviously, then, for minds in which the divine was
identified with the supernatural, the observation of nature lost all
religious interest, for to them divine presence was not revealed in the
course of nature but rather in interferences with its laws. For the
same reason, religious life became one of abstraction from the world,
and the secular life of man, its domestic, social, political relations,
gradually came to be recognized as outside the sphere of spiritual
things.
The reaction to this false separation of the natural and spiritual,
the human and the divine, not only reawakened interest in nature, as
indicated by the scientific revival of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, but gave rise as well to the pantheistic tendency in
philosophy, so distinctively characteristic of Bruno's speculative
waitings for Bruno was decidedly opposed to the conception of a
supramundane God, and a world in whose life and thought no
divine element could be discerned. Instead, he seemed to intuitively
discern in the phenomena of the external world in which science had
begun to perceive an intelligible order and law, and in the inner
world of mind, to whose boundless wealth of thought the conscious-
ness of the time was becoming awakened, the immediate expression
of a divine presence and life and not the mere production of a
distant omnipotence. "The true philosopher," he says, "differs
from the theologian in this, that the former seeks the infinite Being,
not outside the world, but within it. We must begin, in other words,
by recognizing the universal agent in creation, before attempting
to rise to that elevated region in which theology finds the archetype
of created beings."^
The means Bruno employed to give a philosophic justification to
the idea of an immanent relation of God to the world consisted
partly of a recurrence to Xeo- Platonic figures and analogies, partly
in a manipulation of the Aristotelian categories of matter and form,
and of potentiality and actuality, the former point of view serving as
the basis for his studied exposition of the notion of a "soul of the
world," by which the universe is considered as an infinite, living
^ De la causa, Wagner's edit., i. p. 175.
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organism, not created by any outward cause, but having within
itself the principle of all its existences and activities, in other words,
being that beyond which nothing exists and in which all things live,
move, and have their being; and which principle he furthermore
compared to the principle of life in the root or seed, "which sends
forth from itself shoots, branches, twigs, etc., which disposes and
fashions the delicate tissue of leaves, flowers, fruit, and again, by
the same interior energy, recalls the sap to the root." To natural
things, it is, in one sense, external for it cannot be regarded as itself
a part of the thing it creates, and, in another, internal for it does
not act on matter or outside of matter, but wholl}' from within, in
the very heart of matter. And again it is represented as an "inner
artist" of infinite productiveness, differing from a human artist in
that the latter works on matter which is alread\' living or instinct
with form, whereas no such presupposition is invohed in the case of
the former. To him, although we may recoil from viewing the
universe as a living thing, we can no more conceive any form which
is not already, directly or indirectly, the expression of a soul, than
we can conceive a thing which has absolutely no form. And though
it would be absurd to regard the productions of human art as living
forms, yet my table, such, though not animate consists not onlv of
matter taken from nature but is composed as well of materials
already living. Consequently there is nothing, however, minute or
worthless; that does not contain life or soul.-
Whereas the human artist works on materials taken from nature,
and which as part of nature already have a life and being of their
own. the divine, or inner artist, has no pre-existing materials on
which to operate ; His art is therefore creative, of the materials as
well as of the infinitely diversified forms into wdiich thev have been
fashioned. In Him creative and formative energ\- are the same
;
and if lower forms should be changed by Him into higher forms of
existence they are not taken from a province foreign to Him but are
already innate with His own life, while the latter are merely a new
expression of its inexhaustible energy. This thought finds further
utterance, in a slightly varied form however, in Bruno's view that
the ideas of efficient and final cause are inseparable in the divine
artist in contrast with the human, for in nature, he contended, the
efficient cause cannot be separated from the final as every reasonable
act presupposes an end or design, that design being "nothing else
2 De la causa, i. p. 241.
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than the form of the thing to be produced. From which it follows
that an intelligence capable of producing all, and of raising them
bv a marvellous art from potentiality into actuality, should contain
in itself the forms and essences of all things."^ As it is intelligence,
or the soul of the world, that creates natural things, it is not possible
for the formal to be distinct from the efficient cause for the}- must
unite in the inner principle of things.
In his conception of the world as a living organism, Bruno
carried this latter thought still further, ^^'hereas the conception
lies outside the materials on which he works in the case of the
human artist, it is the contrary with the design at work in the
creation of an organized structure, for then the ideal principle, or
formative power, accompanies the matter and constitutes its essence,
such a principle being considered as having been present from the
beginning, inspiring the first minutest atom with the power of the
eventual perfect whole. The inner principle, the life within, is first
cause as well as last ; and when applied to the universe deduces a
universe containing within itself the principle of its own being, a
vast organism, as it were, in which the least and most insignificant
of finite existences presupposes and manifests the end to be realized,
and in which the first principle is at once the beginning and end of
all. Unfortunately, Bruno failed to realize all that is contained in
this conception, yet when we trace the course of his procedure from
his fundamental thought to an explanation of God, and His relation
to the world, it is easy to see how, under the limiting influence of the
scholastic categories, the inherent wealth of his own idea escaped
him.
In an eiTort to determine the nature of the first principle of all
things, Bruno employed the Aristotelian distinction of "form" and
"matter" saying in part : "Democritus and the Epicureans hold that
there is no real existence which is not corporeal ; they regard matter
as the sole substance of things, and assert that it is itself the divine
nature. These, with the Stoics and others, hold also that forms are
simply the accidental dispositions of matter. ... A closer examina-
tion, however, forces us to recognize in nature two kinds of sub-
stances, form and matter. If, therefore, there is an active principle
which is the constitutive principle of all, there is also a subject or
passive principle corresponding to it, a something that is capable of
3 Dc la causa, i. p. 237.
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being acted on as well as a something that is capable of acting.
Human art cannot operate except on the surface of things already
formed bv nature ; . . . but nature operates, so to speak, from the
center of its subject-matter, which is altogether tmformed. There-
fore the subject-matter of the arts is manifold, but the subject-
matter of natiu'e is one, seeing that all diversity proceeds from
form."'^ What Bruno sought to prove by this passage and similiar
others is that the conceptions of matter and form are correlative, in
other words, that neither is apprehensible in abstraction from the
other, and that we are compelled by the necessities of thought to
conceive of a primal substance which is neither matter nor form
alone but rather a unity of the two. And again we arrive at the
same result in considering the distinction of substances corporeal
and incorporeal. "It is necessary that of all things that subsist there
should be one principle of subsistence. . . . But all distinguishable
things presuppose something indistinguishable. That indistinguish-
able something is a common reason to which the difiference and
distinctive form are added." Furthermore "it is necessar}- that there
be one thing which corresponds to the common reason of both sub-
jects. ... a first essence which contains in itself the principle of its
being. If body, as is generally agreed, presupposes a matter which
is not body, and which therefore naturally precedes that which we
designate as properly corporeal, we cannot admit any absolute in-
compatibility between matter and the substances which we name
immaterial. ... If we discern something formal and divine in
corporeal substances, on the same principle we must say that there
is something material in divine substances. As Plotinus sa}S. if the
intelligible world contains an infinite variety of existences, there
must be in them, along with their characteristics difirerences, some-
thing which the}' all have in common, and that common element
takes the place of matter as the distinctive element takes that of
form. . . . This common basis of things material and immaterial, in
so far as it includes a multiplicity of forms, is multiple and any-
formed, but in itself it is absolutely simple and indivisible; and
because it is all, it cannot be itself any one particular being. "-' Such
considerations are, however, not suggestive of the idea of an
extramundane God but rather "of the soul of the world as the
•* De la causa, p. 251.
5 De la causa, i. pp. 269, 270, 272.
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actuality of all, the potentiality of all, and everything is one."*'
"There is one form or soul, one matter or body, which is the fulfill-
ment of all and the perfection of all, which cannot be limited or
determined, and is therefore vmchangeable.'"^
Though Bruno's aim was to attain to a first principle which
should be the living source and explanation of all finite existences,
material and spiritual, the result of his reasoning was far different
to that which he supposed himself to have reached, for the false
method by which he proceeded led him to a unity which excludes,
rather than comprehends, all determinations—an empty abstraction,
and not a being which embraces in its concrete unity the whole in-
exhaustible wealth of the finite world. Upon finding that the ideas
of matter and form, as well as of corporeal and spiritual, cannot be
separately retained, he failed to rise to a higher unity which
transcends yet comprehends both ; instead he sought to find his
higher unity in that which matter and form, mind and body, have
in common when their differences are eliminated. He erred in
thinking, like so many others, that he could explain the differences
and contrarieties of existence by simply eliminating or ignoring
them. xA.nd therefore his first or highest principle (which he identi-
fied with God), in which he thought he had reached the origin and
end of all things, became nothing more than the abstraction of
"Being."
If Bruno's idea of God were thus depleted of all reality, his idea
of the finite world fared no better for the same reason. In seeking
a first principle, or "soul of the world," in which all finite existences
should find their being and reality, he could arrive only to a solution
which necessarily implied at once the nihility of all finite beings
apart from God, and their reality in God, for his fundamental notion
of an organic unity made it necessary for him to explain the universe
as an organism in which the parts are simply dead, meaningless frag-
ments in separation from the life or vital principle of the whole, as
well as showing that through their relation to that principle they
cease to be such unreal abstractions. "In its externality," he says,
"nature is nothing more than a shadow, an empty image of the first
principle in which potentiality and actuality are one. . . . Thou art
not nearer to the infinite by being man rather than insect, by being
star rather than sun. And what I say of these I understand of all
6 Ibid., p. 275.
^ Ibid., p. 280.
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things whose subsistence is particular. Now, if all these particular
things are not different in the infinite, they are not really different.
Therefore the universe is still one, and immovable. It comi)rehends
all and admits of no difference of being, nor of an\' change with
itself or in itself. It is all that can be, and in it is no dift'erence of
potentiality and actuality.*^ . . . Individuals which continuall\- change
do not take a new existence, but only a new manner of being. It is
in this sense that Solomon has said, 'There is nothing new under the
sun, but that which is was before." As all things are in the imi\erse
and the universe is in all things, as we are in it and it is in us, so all
concur to one perfect unitw which is sole, stable and ever remaining.
It is one and eternal. E\ery form of existence, every other thing
is vanity, every thing outside of that one is nothing."^ While his
method enabled him to prove the unreality of all finite existences
apart from the first principle, what he could not prove was that
even in their relation to this "soul of the world" any reality was
left to them, for viewed as that which is reached by abstraction from
the limits of finite existences, the first principle annuls rather than
explains them. Their finitude is their distinction from God ; and
though the withdrawal of their finitude makes them one with God
equall}- as well makes them lost in God.
In summation, Bruno sought not only to justify for thought the
idea of the absolute unity of all things but to explain the universe
from itself, and in the idea of God endeavored to find the immanent
cause or principle of the world. In him, the first jirinciple is the
union of potentiality and actualit}- : and whether considered as a
principle realizing itself in the actual (God), or as all actuality in
relation to its principle (Nature), it is the same only differently
contemplated. And finally, he failed to reach the result to which
he aimed—a concrete unity, simply because he employed a method
that can yield only an abstract one.
^ De la causa, i. p. 281.
9 De la causa, i. p. 283.
